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Japanese Fair Trade Commission




Despite cries of non-tariff barriers, a government subsidized
export industry and a non-consumer oriented population, the un-
avoidable fact is that Japan has one of the largest and most sophis-
ticated markets in the world. This fact is not entirely lost to
United States businessmen; U.S. companies are continuously mov-
ing into the Japanese market, forming joint ventures, licensing
technology and distributing products. Realities of Japanese busi-
ness practice frequently dictate utilizing a Japanese partner for
successful market penetration. Documentation of the resulting
business tie-ups, however, frequently falls on American counsel.
For the most part, drafting a license or distributorship agreement
between a Japanese and a United States party requires the same
skills of legal draftsmanship as drafting a domestic agreement.
Before the client departs for Tokyo, however, U.S. counsel should
be aware of specific points which may arise under Japanese law
and which, if not anticipated in the documentation, may upset the
business deal reached by the parties. These points are not "non-
tariff barriers;" they are legal rules arising under the Japanese
antimonopoly law.
If the proposed agreement between the parties is to be gov-
erned by the law of a state of the United States, Japanese domestic
laws will apply to activities conducted within Japanese jurisdic-
tion. One of these laws is the Law Relating to Prohibition of Pri-
vate Monopoly and Methods of Preserving Fair Trade of Japan.'
* A.B. 1971, Connecticut College; J.D. 1974, Harvard Law School. Ms. Higgins is an
associate of Graham & James in Los Angeles, California and is currently on leave of absence
with Braun Moriya Hoashi & Kubota in Tokyo, Japan.
1. Shiteki dokusen no kinshi oyobi kdsei torihiki no kakuho ni kansuru hOritsu (Law
relating to prohibition of private monopoly and methods of preserving fair trade of Japan)
(Law No. 54, 1947, as amended), in 2 EHS No. 2270-2279, reprinted in JAPAN MiNISTRy Or
FINANCE, GUIDE To ECONOMIC LAws or JAPAN 595 (University Publications of America, Inc.
Loy. L.A. Int'l & Comp. L. Ann.
U.S. counsel and businessmen may assume that they are familiar
with the legal strictures of this legislation, particularly after learn-
ing that it was based on U.S. antitrust law.' In part this assump-
tion would be justified. The American businessman who fixes
prices, divides markets or ties products in Japan would suffer
much the same fate under the Antimonopoly Act as under the
Sherman and Clayton Acts. However, the Japanese interpretation
and application of the prohibition of monopoly and unfair business
practices has quite predictably diverged from the American experi-
ence. In particular, the Japanese concept of unfair business prac-
tices has developed to include practices which American business
considers not only fair but indispensable in any license or distribu-
torship agreement. It is when these concepts diverge that the par-
ties' basic business deal is jeopardized and when counsel may be
called upon to salvage the agreement by skillful drafting within the
boundaries of the Antimonopoly Act.
This article will discuss a few of the most common problems
encountered under the Antimonopoly Act in international license
and distributorship agreements with Japanese parties. It cannot of
course cover all practices which may be found to be unfair business
practices under Japanese law in a particular fact situation. Prac-
tices which are clearly antitrust violations under U.S. law, such as
price-fixing, tying, market division, boycotts, and predatory pric-
ing, are mentioned here only briefly, although they are also prohib-
ited by the Antimonopoly Act;3 U.S. counsel can reasonably antici-
pate that price-fixing will be a problem. It is the unexpected
interpretation of unfair business practice that will give rise to the
practical negotiating problems.
These problems will be practical and immediate. Counsel will
not be dealing with abstract considerations of illegality or un-
enforceability. He or she will be dealing with objections raised dur-
ing a post-execution review of the agreement by the Japanese Fair
Trade Commission (FTC).' The Antimonopoly Act requires that
reprint ed. 1979), [hereinafter cited as Antimonopoly Act).
2. KOSE TORIHIKI KYoKAi (Fair Trade Institute), ANTIMONOPOLY LEGISLATION IN JAPAN
71-72 (1977). See D. HENDERSON, FOREIGN ENTERPRISE IN JAPAN 149-54 (1973); KANAZAWA,
Regulation of Corporate Enterprise, in LAW IN JAPAN 480, 484-90 (A. von Mehren ed. 1963).
See generally E. HADLEY, AwrimusT IN JAPAN 3-19 (1977).
3. Antimonopoly Act, supra note 1, at arts. 2(9), 3.
4. The Japanese Fair Trade Commission [hereinafter FTC] is the K6sei Torihiki Iin-
kai. For a discussion of the FTC's administrative practice, see KANAZAWA, supra note 2; and
Sanekata, Administrative Guidance and the Antimonopoly Law, 10 LAW IN JAPAN 65
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all international agreements be submitted for such review within
thirty days of conclusion.' Antimonopoly law problems in U.S.-
Japanese agreements are not resolved in litigation after perform-
ance under the agreement; they are resolved immediately over a
telex machine by revising the agreement until satisfactory to the
FTC.
II. THE FTC REvIEw
The Antimonopoly Act was enacted in 1947, largely under the
sponsorship of the American Occupation Forces. It was based on
U.S. antitrust statutes but also incorporated principles of antitrust
law developed by United States courts.6 On many points it was
more severe than the parallel American provisions; for example, vi-
olations which are subject to a rule of reason in the United States
were per se violations of the Antimonopoly Act as originally en-
acted.' Later amendments mitigated the severe objective rules
however, and eliminated prohibitions incompatible with Japanese
business practices.'
The present Act has approximately one hundred articles in
ten parts. Areas of regulation include private monopoly trade as-
sociations, interlocking business relationships and unfair business
practices. Supplementing the Act are FTC Guidelines and Notifi-
cations on specific topics. Both the Act and the FTC Guidelines
are available in semi-official English translation."
Practice under the Antimonopoly Act is hampered by the al-
most complete lack of court decisions interpreting the Act and the
Guidelines. As of 1977, only thirty-one cases in all areas of Anti-
monopoly law had been brought in the Tokyo High Court.'0 Unlike
American antitrust law, the Japanese legislation is essentially an
administrative law enforced by government personnel in private
consultation with the parties.
The responsible government agency is the Fair Trade Com-
(1977).
5. Antimonopoly Act, supra note 1, at art. 6(2).
6. K6ism ToRHIu KYoKA, supra note 2, at 71.
7. D. HENDERSON, supra note 2, at 148-50.
8. KOsEI ToliHiKi KyoiKo, supra note 2, at 71.
9. The publishers of the EHS (Eibun-HMrei-Sha, Inc.) Law Bulletin Series, Tokyo,
Japan, publish an English translation of the Antimonopoly Act and FTC Notifications and
Guidelines. Although the translation is prepared by FTC staff, it is an unofficial translation.
10. Kom ToRIHK KyoKm, supra note 2, at 95.
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mission established under Chapter VIII of the Act. The Commis-
sion consists of five members appointed by and administratively
answerable to the Prime Minister." In fact the FTC is an unusual
regulatory branch of the Japanese government in which most regu-
latory work is performed by the Ministry officers. Perhaps because
of its unusual status, the FTC has expanded slowly, now operating
with 513 employees in three administrative departments: the
Economic Department, the Trade Practice Department, and the
Investigation Department.
The FTC is empowered with investigative and direct regula-
tory powers. Pursuant to Article 49 of the Act, it may issue com-
plaints against entities alleged to be in violation of the Act, con-
duct hearings, and order cease and desist or other measures
necessary to eliminate the violation. 2 Enforcement may be aided
by court injunction.'3 Violations of the Act are also criminal viola-
tions and criminal proceedings may be commenced on complaint of
the FTC. 4 Although the FTC prefers to work through persuasion
and recommendation, it is a fully empowered regulatory agency
which cannot be disregarded when operating in Japanese
jurisdiction.
Foreign business encounters FTC regulatory powers during
the review required by Article 6 of the Act. Article 6 reads in part
as follows:
Article 6 [Prohibited international agreements]
(2) An entrepreneur who has entered into an international
agreement or an international contract, shall, in accordance with
the Rules of the Fair Trade Commission, file a'report thereof with
the Commission, accompanied by a copy of the said agreement or
contract (in the case of an oral agreement or contract, a document
describing the contents thereof), within thirty days as from the
execution of such act.
(3) The provisions of the preceding subsection shall not apply to
an agreement or contract regarding a single transaction (exclud-
ing such transactions of which the delivery of goods extends over
a period of one year), or to an agreement or contract merely cre-
ating an agency in business matters (excluding an agreement or
contract containing conditions that restrict the business activities
11. Antimonopoly Act, supra note 1, at arts. 28, 29(2).
12. Id. arts. 45 to 70-2.
13. Id. art. 67.
14. Id. art. 96.
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of the other party).
Curiously, the origin of this provision was a plan to curb activ-
ities of the powerful Japanese trade associations which had oper-
ated internationally prior to the Pacific War.'8 Article 8 of the Act
still specifically prohibits trade associations from entering into
international agreements in restraint of trade. However, the filing
requirement was not expressly limited to a particular class of con-
tract parties and on its face requires all Japanese entities to com-
ply. In 1971, the FTC issued a concise notification restating the
Article 6 filing requirement for all international agreements. 6
Until relatively recently, the Article 6 review was of minor im-
portance insofar as it followed a more stringent approval process
conducted by the Japanese Foreign Investment Council. The FTC
was represented on the Council and antimonopoly questions were
essentially disposed of during the Council review. Liberalization of
international trade and investment has, however, relaxed the
Council approval process. Present government approval require-
ments are limited to a routine notice and approval by the Ministry
with jurisdiction over the industry.17 After this change, the Article
6 review by the FTC acquired a more significant place in the par-
ties' planning.18
In light of the above, it should be emphasized that the FTC
review is a review only, not an approval requirement. Except for
unusual cases, the agreement must be executed by the parties and
legally binding (subject to subsequent approval of the Japanese
Government where applicable) prior to submission to the FTC.
There is no bar on the parties' commencing performance under the
agreement while the review is pending. Since the FTC may take
several months to complete the process, most parties in fact do
commence operations under the agreement.
The obligation to submit an agreement for review is on the
Japanese party. Unless the foreign party is otherwise doing busi-
ness in Japan through a subsidiary or branch office, it has no duty
to participate in or to verify the submission of the agreement to
15. D. HENDERSON, supra note 2, at 153.
16. Kokusai-teki kyotei mata wa kokusai-teki keiyaku no todokeide ni kansuru kisoku
(Regulation concerning filing a report of an international agreement or international con-
tract) (FTC Reg. No. 1, 1971), in 2 EHS No. 2279.
17. Gaikoku kawase kanrirei (Cabinet order regarding foreign exchange control) (Cabi-
net Order No. 203, 1950), in 5 EHS No. 5050.
18. D. HENDEMSON, supra note 2, at 154.
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the FTC. In practice, however, counsel for the foreign party should
urge prompt submission. If the FTC is going to raise objections to
provisions of the agreement, the foreign party whose technology is
being disclosed or whose products are to be shipped to Japan will
not want to learn of the legal difficulties a year or two into
performance.
The submission process itself is relatively simple. An original
or verified copy of the agreement and a Japanese translation are
delivered to the FTC offices together with a brief summary of per-
tinent provisions on an official FTC form. Three forms are avail-
able from the FTC: one each for license agreements, distributor-
ship agreements, and all other international agreements, including
joint venture agreements. Counsel for the foreign party should be
aware that these forms contain space for the filing party to indi-
cate such agreement terms as non-competition clauses, territorial
restrictions, raw material purchase requirements, and other provi-
sions which may in fact raise issues under the Antimonopoly Act.
Thus the possibility that the FTC will overlook an objectionable
provision in the parties' agreement is substantially diminished."
Usually, the first notice that the United States or other foreign
party has of an FTC problem is a letter or telex from its Japanese
partner. The communication typically announces that certain pro-
visions of the heavily-negotiated and already executed agreement
must be amended in accordance with an FTC recommendation.
Some of the provisions which commonly suffer this fate are dis-
cussed below.
III. FTC GUIDELINES
To assist both Japanese and non-Japanese parties in avoiding
provisions which constitute unfair business practices, the FTC has
issued two sets of Guidelines for international agreements.' The
19. Despite the information specified in the filing form, the FTC does occasionally fail
to object within the normal time period to provisions essentially identical to provisions pre-
viously objected to in other agreements. This enables the parties to retain and legally en-
force the provision as part of their agreement. However, because there is no time limit on
FTC objections, the parties should be advised that the FTC may raise the question and
require amendment months or even years after the filing date.
20. Kokusai-teki gijutsu donyu keiyaku ni kansuru nintei kijun (Antimonopoly act
guidelines for international licensing agreements) (FTC, May 24, 1968), reprinted in H.
IyoRI, ANTIMONOPOLY LEGISLATION IN JAPAN 199 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Licensing
Guidelines]; Yunyu sodairiten keiyaku to ni okeru fukoseina torihiki hoho ni kansuru
nintei kijun (Antimonopoly act guidelines for sole import distributorship agreements)
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Guidelines are advisory only, as is evident from the language of the
introductory paragraphs. The enumerated practices are described
as "[almong the restrictions which are liable to come under unfair
business practices."'"
The description of these objectionable restrictions in the
Guidelines is generalized and extremely vague. There are no exam-
ples. Interpretation is entirely within the discretion of the FTC
and it is important to note that the interpretation and application
have occasionally changed without revision of the Guidelines them-
selves.22 For foreign legal counsel, the Guidelines rarely give suffi-
cient guidance concerning the FTC position to enable effective le-
gal counseling. Nonetheless, the specific problems which are
discussed in detail in this article are referred to in the Guidelines,
which serve as a convenient starting point in understanding the
substantive content of the FTC review process.
The Antimonopoly Act Guidelines for International Licensing
Agreements were issued in 1968. The short, three article, 561-word
Guidelines list a total of nine restrictions wich are liable to come
under unfair business practices in the licensing context. One of the
objectionable restrictions involves controlling the Japanese licen-
see's export of goods produced under the license. However, restric-
tions are permissible if the licensor has patent protection in, is sell-
ing directly into, or has licensed a third party in the restricted
territory." Four of the additional objectionable restrictions are es-
sentially tying and resale price maintenance provisions.2 4 Also sub-
ject to FTC objection are provisions requiring payment of a royalty
on goods not utilizing the licensed technology." The foregoing six
restrictions are not frequently cited by the FTC in the review pro-
cess. The majority of FTC objections focus on the remaining three
prohibited restrictions: grant-back obligations of the licensee, s
(FTC, Nov. 21, 1972) [hereinafter cited as Distributorship Guidelines).
21. Licensing Guidelines, supra note 20, at art. 1. The language of the Distributorship
Guidelines is slightly different: "[a]mong the restrictions which are likely to constitute un-
fair business practices ...." Distributorship Guidelines, supra note 20, at art. 1. There is
no evidence that this difference reflects a substantive difference in FTC administrative prac-
tice under the Distributorship Guidelines.
22. The Japanese bar learns of changes in FTC interpretation or application of the
Guidelines when the Commission objects to a previously acceptable provision. FTC staff
may also indicate a policy change in a public address or interview.
23. Licensing Guidelines, supra note 20, at art. 1(1)(a)-(c).
24. Id. arts. 1(2), 1(4)-(6).
25. Id. art. 1(8).
26. Id. art. 1(7).
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non-competiton clauses,' and quality control provisions.'8
The subject matter and scope of the Antimonopoly Guidelines
for Sole Distributorship Agreements are similar to the Licensing
Guidelines. Also consisting of three articles and totalling 485
words, the Distributorship Guidelines list six restrictions which are
likely to constitute unfair business practices in continuous import
and sale agreements. Restrictions on resale prices"9 and class of
purchaser" are subject to challenge. Obligations to purchase parts,
ingredients, attachments, and other items from the contract party
are objectionable except in the case of component repair parts.8 '
Restrictions on parallel import" and termination clauses are in-
cluded among the six.33 The most commonly cited prohibited re-
striction however, is the non-competition clause restriction on
dealing in competitive goods." The Guidelines do permit such re-
striction but only in certain circumstances.
In summary, the three areas in which foreign licensors and
manufacturers most frequently encounter problems under the
Guidelines are grant-back license provisions, non-competition
clauses, and quality control. The foreign party to the agreement is
usually unprepared for the FTC interpretation of these points in
the Guidelines. To fully comprehend the precise requirements as
developed under FTC administrative practice it is necesary to ex-
amine the types of provisions which are objected to by the FTC.
A. Grant-Back License Provisions
The grant-back license of all improvements by and know-how
of the licensee is a contract provision basic to the goals of every
licensor. In a superior marketing position, (in control of market-
able patents and technology), the licensor demands and usually
gets rights to the licensee's developments on terms favorable to the
licensor. The licensee, eager to get the technology and only dimly
aware of its potential contribution usually gives away, if not the
world, then certainly that part of it which may be called its im-
27. Id. art. 1(3).
28. Id. art. 1(9).
29. Distributorship Guidelines, supra note 20, at art. 1(1).
30. Id. art. 1(2).
31. Id. .rt. 1(3).
32. Id. art. 1(4).
33. Id. art. 1(5).
34. Id. art. 1(6).
[Vol. 3
Japanese Fair Trade
provements. A typical grant-back provision found in a 1956 agree-
ment between a U.S. licensor and a Japanese licensee reads as
follows:
Licensee agrees to grant and hereby grants to Licensor an exclu-
sive, royalty-free, world-wide irrevocable right and license under
Licensee's Patent Rights and Technical Information; together
with the royalty-free, irrevocable right to grant such right and li-
cense to others; provided, however, that Licensee reserves the
right to use its own Patent Rights and Technical Information in
its own operations in all countries of the world.
Today the above clause would almost certainly fail to survive the
FTC Article 6 review.
The FTC approach to grant-back provisions is initially to pro-
hibit all such provisions as unfair business practices. The Guide-
lines then make the following proviso: "However, such cases are
excluded [from the FTC ban] where the licensor bears similar obli-
gations and the obligations of both parties are equally balanced in
substance."35 The key to protecting the foreign licensor's grant-
back rights is to comprehend the meaning of this language as ap-
plied by the FTC. The concept is a surprisingly rigid interpreta-
tion of mutality and equality that has sent many well-drafted
agreements back into the word processor.
The above-quoted proviso does not mean that the grant-back
is acceptable to the FTC simply because the licensor obligates it-
self to disclose improvements developed by it subsequent to the
initial transfer of technology. To be sure, that is the minimum re-
quirement imposed by the phrase "the licensor bears similar obli-
gations." The licensor who wishes to transfer technology without
improvements had better resign itself to ignorance of its Japanese
licensee's developments. This rule is absolute even in fact situa-
tions where presumably the Japanese party is not concerned with
improvement technology. An example is a license granted under an
equipment manufacturing and supply agreement. The licensor
under such an agreement may want the licensee in question to
manufacture equipment which does not incorporate the latest
technology. The licensee is presumably content to do so for the
contract price. The licensor as a matter of course wants any im-
provements the licensee may discover during the manufacturing
process, but it does not want to be under an obligation to disclose
35. Licensing Guidelines, supra note 20, at art. 1(7).
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its latest technology. The licensee is not, after all, even using the
equipment in question. The logical arguments against mutuality
notwithstanding, the Japanese FTC will not permit a one-sided ob-
ligation on the part of the licensee. For the licensor in this fact
situation, the required mutuality can be a serious obstacle to pro-
ceeding with the agreement."
Most licensors are not in this extreme position. They are will-
ing to disclose improvements to their licensees as a natural aspect
of a technology license. They may still, however, encounter serious
obstacles as a result of the FTC's concept of obligations "equally
balanced in substance." At first the equality demanded may seem
relatively straight-forward. In one licensing agreement, the licensor
agreed to disclose "all proprietary information relating to the pro-
duction of the Products" whereas the licensee was required to dis-
close "all information developed by it relating to production of the
Products." The FTC cited this language as "unfair as to the scope
of the technology" because "proprietary" was omitted from the li-
censee's obligation. Whenever possible within the agreement of the
parties, strict parallel structure should be adopted when drafting
grant and grant-back provisions.
The simplicity of the foregoing example is, however, mislead-
ing. The FTC views the test of equality not only in the context of
specific grant and grant-back provisions but within the entire
framework of the license agreement. Considered in light of termi-
nation rights, territorial limitations, royalty obligations, and other
aspects of the parties' agreement, substantial equality is in fact an
extremely complex concept. Under FTC review standards, the
equality must extend to all parts of the agreement and it must be
maintained throughout the performance, termination, or expira-
tion of the license.
One example of how this concept can disrupt the parties' busi-
ness deal involved a license agreement for a popular American con-
fection. Under the terms of the agreement, the licensor granted the
licensee an exclusive license for an initital ten year term, renewable
for an additional ten year term at the option of the licensee. At the
36. This example and all examples in the text are drawn from actual case histories of
transactions between foreign and Japanese parties involved in the FTC Article 6 review
process. In some examples details such as the product involved or the nationality of the
foreign party have been changed to preclude identification of the actual transaction. The
business aspects of some examples have also been simplified to eliminate terms not relevant
to the discussion. Files on the transactions discussed are not available to the public.
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end of the twenty year term but not the ten year term, the licensee
was to have a paid-up license to the technology. The licensor
agreed to disclose all relevant technological information and to
provide the licensee with all improvements developed during the
effective term or terms. The licensee on its part agreed to make
royalty payments and to develop the Japanese market. It further
agreed to grant the licensor an irrevocable, royalty-free, and non-
exclusive right to use the licensee's improvements in all territories
of the world excluding Japan. The parties prudently provided that
the grant-back license would terminate in the event the agreement
was terminated due to a breach by the licensor. That did not, how-
ever, save the clause from FTC attack.
The FTC objected to this agreement based on its unan-
nounced, but generally applied rule that a licensor should not be
able to use the grant-back technology at any time after the licensee
loses its rights to use the core technology. Once this unwritten rule
is known, the analysis of the problem presented by the confection
license is quite simple. If the licensee opted not to renew the li-
cense for the second ten year term, it would lose all rights to the
licensor's technology. In contrast, the licensor could continue use
of the grant-back technology for as long as it was commercially via-
ble. The FTC recommended amendment to require the licensor to
cease use of grant-back technology upon notice of licensee's intent
not to renew. Alternatively, the FTC would have approved the
grant-back term as submitted if the licensee were given paid-up
rights after the initial ten year term.
Other amendments to remedy the inequality were considered
by the parties. The agreement could have provided for a straight
twenty year term with appropriate royalty adjustments. The par-
ties considered retaining the original term provision but providing
for a royalty on the grant-back technology in the event the licensee
did not renew. All possible alternatives presented difficulties from
a business viewpoint and ultimately the licensor agreed to cease
use of the grant-back technology in the event of non-renewal. The
licensor thus accepted an agreement less favorable than the licen-
see itself had originally been willing to conclude. This result could
have been avoided if the licensor had knowledge of this problem
prior to negotiation with the licensee.
Though duration of rights to technology must be rigidly equal-
ized, the FTC does adopt a unique form of flexibility on some
agreement terms. The primary example of this concerns the terri-
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tory in which the licensor and licensee may use their respective
license rights. This is illustrated by an agreement which grants the
licensee exclusive rights to the Japanese market with a world-wide
but non-exclusive grant-back to the licensor. Although on first con-
sideration this may appear to be an inequality, the FTC has a high
regard for exclusivity and will permit the exclusive aspect of a li-
cense to balance other ostensible inequalities in the licensed terri-
tories. Accordingly agreements with the above territorial provisions
are routinely passed without objection by the FTC.
Counsel should be wary however, of any conditions or limits
on the all-important exclusivity. As one United States cosmetics
manufacturer found to its regret, the territorial inequality is toler-
ated only as long as the exclusivity is in effect.
The cosmetics license as executed gave the Japanese party a
fifteen year exclusive license for the Japanese market, conditional
on achievement of an annual minimum royalty. One section of the
agreement provided that the license would become non-exclusive
at the option of the licensor upon failure of the licensee to achieve
the minimum royalty amount in any one year period. The Ameri-
can party received a royalty-free grant-back license for use in all
territories of the world excluding Japan. During its review of the
agreement, the FTC focused on that section and declared that ex-
clusivity was not assured the Japanese party. To restore substan-
tial equality, the FTC recommended a provision that in the event
the section was relied upon to cancel the licensee's exclusivity, the
licensor's use of the grant-back technology would be limited to the
United States. Because the FTC's suggestion was not acceptable to
the U.S. party, the section was deleted in its entirety.
Having struggled with what may appear to be the FTC's tit-
for-tat mentality in pursuit of substantial equality, the non-Japa-
nese party must sometimes learn another distressing aspect of the
equality standard. The FTC as a Japanese government agency is
mandated to protect the Japanese market from unfair business
practices. It has no duty to prevent unfair business practices which
affect other markets. "Other markets" includes the foreign party to
an international agreement. In short, the FTC will not raise points
of inequality which are favorable to the Japanese party and detri-
mental to the non-Japanese party only.
This point was illustrated in the cosmetics licensing agreement
discussed above. Apart from the option ultimately deleted, the
terms of that agreement resulted in the Japanese party acquiring a
[Vol. 3
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royalty-free, world-wide, paid-up license for the technology at the
conclusion of the fifteen year term. The U.S. party received and
retained a royalty-free license for the world excluding Japan. In
this fact situation, the foreign party waits in vain for the FTC to
object and recommend removal of the exclusion of Japan or limita-
tion on the licensee's rights in the U.S. Since the United States
Federal Trade Commission is unlikely to intervene on the licen-
sor's behalf, counsel for the U.S. party must apply the substantial
equality rule on behalf of its client during the negotiation period
for the desired result.
As the above examples illustrate, grant-back provisions of li-
censing agreements are a fertile source of FTC objections. The li-
censor's ability to tie up improvement technology is carefully lim-
ited by the FTC Guidelines enforced through the Article 6 review.
Yet for the licensor the grant-back is an essential provision to the
agreement, without which it may fall behind its licensee in techno-
logical innovation. In drafting the grant-back, counsel for the licen-
sor should therefore weigh each term of the agreement to assure
that the FTC rule of substantial equality is met on terms most
favorable to his or her client.
B. Non-Competition Provisions
Objections to non-competition clauses arise under both license
agreements and distributorship agreements with Japanese parties.
For the foreign corporation introducing its technology or its prod-
ucts into Japan such clauses have two important functions. First, a
non-competition clause is essential to assure that the Japanese
party will utilize its technology or promote its products to the ex-
clusion of competing technology or products. Second, the foreign
licensor or manufacturer must be assured that the Japanese party
will not become a competitor immediately after termination of the
agreement. To achieve these goals, however, counsel for the foreign
party will have to draft successfully within the FTC guidelines.
As in the case of grant-back clauses, the FTC position starts
from an outright ban on such restrictions in license or distributor-
ship agreements. 7 For the manufacturer or licensor not willing to
grant an exclusive status to the Japanese party, the ban is abso-
lute. The FTC will require deletion of a non-competition clause in
37. Licensing Guidelines, supra note 20, at art. 1(3); Distributorship Guidelines, supra
note 20, at art. 1(6).
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any non-exclusive licensing or distributorship agreement for the
Japanese market.
If, however, the foreign party is willing to grant exclusivity,
the exclusive right can balance the competitive restriction on the
Japanese party. This is the same principle which permits exclusiv-
ity to balance unequal territorial grants in the grant-back context.
Thus the FTC will approve the following provision in an exclusive
distributorship or licensing agreement:
[Japanese Party] will not undertake the manufacture, import or
sale in the Territory of products competing with the Products as
herein defined during the term of the Agreement.
The licensor or manufacturer who has bought non-competition
with exclusivity may suspect that its right to enforce that provision
lasts only as long as the exclusivity. That is correct. If there are
conditions in the agreement which permit a change to non-exclu-
sivity, the FTC will recommend an amendment to the non-compe-
tition clause permitting use of competitive technology or products
by the non-exclusive licensee or distributor.
For non-competition to be absolute, the exclusivity must also
be absolute. Even the manufacturer or licensor must be completely
excluded from the Japanese market. A European liquor manufac-
turer recently entered into a distributorship agreement with a ma-
jor Japanese beverage wholesaler for essentially exclusive represen-
tation of its premium cognac. The agreement contained a non-
competition clause carefully drafted to cover only other high-quali-
ty cognac products. Up to this point, the FTC would have no ob-
jection to the agreement terms. However, the manufacturer then
decided for convenience to retain direct sales rights to certain air-
line and ships stores accounts which it served on a world-wide
basis. As a result of that reservation, the Japanese distributor ac-
quired the right to represent competing cognac to the same airline
and ships stores accounts.
Since the above case involved well-known trademark products,
the result was acceptable to the parties. A U.S. party marketing
engineering services in Japan, however, found that the resulting
right of its sales agent to represent competitors to some accounts
created an impossible marketing situation. Since direct contact
with some accounts was important to its customer relations, the




In addition to the exclusivity prerequisite, the FTC Guidelines
require exclusion from the non-competition clause of all technology
or products already used, manufactured, or sold by the Japanese
party. This aspect of the business agreement has usually been con-
sidered by the parties during negotiations and presents few
problems. The exclusion should, however, be expressly stated in
the agreement, even when the fact situation may appear to make it
unnecessary. -Recently, a United States food products manufac-
turer included the standard non-competition clause in its license
agreement with a new Japanese licensee. The clause did not men-
tion existing products. The licensed technology involved was for a
distinctive line of American cookies: delectable concoctions of
chocolate chips, peanut butter, and other standard American in-
gredients. After the FTC review and objection, and after lengthy
telex exchanges between the parties, the following language was
inserted:
For purposes of this article, sembei and okoshi already manufac-
tured by Licensee shall be deemed not to compete with the
Products.
From the licensor's viewpoint, there had never been any doubt
that the traditional Japanese crackers and tea cakes would not be
directly in competition with the American cookies.
The above two aspects of the non-competition clause relate
principally to support of the product during the term of the agree-
ment. In fact there is little purpose in discussing agreement term
restrictions on competition after termination. The FTC will not
permit this type of non-competition clause under any
circumstances.
Clauses prohibiting competition after termination are most
important in those industries which rely on trade secrets, know-
how, and extensive specialized market development. There is al-
ways a substantial risk that the licensee or distributor will utilize
the know-how gained during the agreement term to launch its own
products in direct competition with the licensor's or manufac-
turer's products. At first, the FTC permitted foreign parties to
place restrictions on sales by Japanese licensees and distributors.
Subsequently, however, the FTC established, and thereafter with
time has shortened, the permissible restriction period-first to
three years, then two years, and finally one year from termination.
Even this has now been eliminated. At the present time, competi-
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tive restrictions may not extend beyond the term of the agreement
unless the license is terminated for default by the licensee. Licen-
sees in default may still be restricted for a two year period or until
the end of the stated license term, whichever occurs first. Licensors
and manufacturers sensitive to the competitive threat from former
contract parties must adopt alternative methods of protecting their
trade secrets and know-how."
In one recent matter involving this FTC position, a consumer
health products manufacturer found itself without competitive
protection from a licensee it had essentially put into the field. The
agreement, which was already in operation between the parties,
stipulated as follows:
Distributor agrees that it shall not during the continuance of this
Agreement and for one year after its termination without the pre-
vious written consent of the Company engage in the manufacture,
sale or distribution of any products sold to the consumer health
care market which are directly or indirectly competitive with the
Company's Products.
Four years after the agreement was filed, the FTC contacted the
Japanese party and took a very strong position that the phrase
"and for one year after its termination" had to be deleted from the
agreement. After extensive negotiation with the FTC reviewer, the
manufacturer agreed to delete the objectionable phrase. At the
same time, however, it won FTC approval for addition of the fol-
lowing clause:
Distributor further agrees that following the termination of this
Agreement it will not thereafter, directly or indirectly in any
manner whatsoever package a product so as to duplicate or re-
semble the Company's Products nor utilize, use or make known or
available to any third party, the confidential information which
has been disclosed to it hereunder.
Although more difficult to enforce than a non-competition clause,
this language gave the U.S. party a legal basis for challenging the
licensee's conduct if the latter began duplication of the licensed
products after termination. This approach should be considered
during negotiations of any agreement with the Japanese party
38. Restrictions on use of proprietary information are generally necessary to protect the
owner's rights in agreements with Japanese parties. In addition to the FTC considerations,
Japanese law permits free exploitation of proprietary information after termination or expi-
ration of the agreement unless the agreement expressly provides otherwise.
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which involves extensive use of trade secrets and know-how.
In conclusion, it is relatively simple to summarize the strategy
which should be used by the foreign party in obtaining competitive
protection from a Japanese licensee or distributor. The licensor or
manufacturer should select a Japanese partner not already manu-
facturing or distributing competing products (although some licen-
sors have felt more comfortable with a licensee which has experi-
ence in the field), make the representation exclusive for the
Japanese market, and then place every possible restriction on the
Japanese party's use or disclosure of know-how, trade secrets, and
technology. By using this approach, the foreign party will be able
to preclude competition during the agreement term and control its
proprietary information after termination. Other more direct ap-
proaches to non-competition are foreclosed by the FTC.
C. Quality Control Provisions
Quality control provisions are standard fare in licensing and
manufacturing agreements. In some cases, control is necessary to
ensure that the licensed technology will work. In others, the clause
is included to protect the licensor from the unenviable result of
shoddy merchandise entering the market under its trademark. The
licensor's power to control its licensee's quality is, however, an-
other area in which the FTC has final say.
In a now familiar pattern, the FTC Guidelines for Inter-
national Licensing Agreements first prohibit all restrictions on
quality of raw materials and parts, etc., or of the patented goods.
The Guidelines then set forth the following proviso:
However, such cases are excluded where such restrictions are nec-
essary to maintain the credibility of the registered trademark or
to insure the effectiveness of the licensed technology. 9
The question of course is how to draft the agreement to come
within the proviso.
Drafting may in fact be the key to an uneventful FTC review
of the quality control provision. Actual experience indicates that
the FTC is more concerned with phrasing and expression of the
quality control clause than with the underlying need for quality
control. Successful in passing the review have been requirements of
"high quality" or other objective measure of quality level. For
39. Licensing Guidelines, supra note 20, at art. 1(9).
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example, the following clause was passed by the FTC without
objection:
Licensee agrees to maintain the highest standards of technical ex-
cellence and quality of its Products. In connection therewith, Li-
censor shall be supplied, upon request, with samples of the li-
censed Products for the purpose of determining that the quality
thereof is on the same level as the standard set by the Licensor
and Licensee for the Japanese market.
The references to jointly agreed standards and to the seemingly
neutral "highest standards of technical excellence" were appar-
ently sufficient to preclude FTC objection. However, the following
clause did not fare as well:
Licensee shall manufacture and/or assemble Products in accor-
dance with Licensor's Standards and the Products so manufac-
tured or assembled shall perform in accordance with Licensor's
Standards.
The FTC required deletion of the entire clause. Apparently the
FTC concluded that this language gave the licensor excessive arbi-
trary power to control the licensee's production or even to termi-
nate the license for failure to meet the licensor's subjective
standards.
The disparate treatment of the above clauses was certainly not
due to an FTC conclusion that the technology and trademark in
the first case justified stricter quality control. The first clause
quoted above was part of a license for an American snack food.
The second clause was found in a license for highly technical
equipment used in nuclear plants.
These and other cases suggest that the stated basis for coming
within the Guidelines' proviso are relatively easily met in the typi-
cal license agreement. There is, however, an unwritten requirement
that the quality control clause be as objective and self-operating as
possible. Clauses giving the licensor the power to judge and reject
the licensee's products may be subject to FTC objection. Neutral
requirements to meet high standards can be structured to give
much the same result as unilateral clauses and are more likely to
pass FTC review.
The cautious draftsman will meet both the written and un-
written requirements. Recitations regarding the need for quality
control are advisable to establish a firm basis for the imposition of
the restriction. Then counsel can exercise imagination in the
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imposition of highest standards of quality.
IV. FTC OBJECTION PROCEDURE
The Japanese party is the first to learn of an FTC objection to
an agreement provision. As the party which filed the agreement, it
will be informed of the FTC objection, usually within two or three
months of the filing date. The FTC will indicate the objectionable
provisions and recommend that they be deleted or amended to
comply with Japanese law. The initial communication is advisory
in tone and often presented as a suggestion that the parties "study
the recommendation and report to the FTC in due course."40
The Japanese party's reaction to the objection will depend on
the status of its relations with the foreign party and the degree to
which the recommended change is beneficial to its interests. In one
case of FTC objection, the Japanese licensee realized that the re-
quested amendments would jeopardize an excellent business rela-
tionship and possibly preclude licenses for additional products. It
accordingly took a very strong position with the FTC, and argued
(1) that the FTC had not objected to similar provisions in previous
agreements; (2) that the time lapse between filing and the objec-
tion was too long; and (3) that its "credit" with the licensor would
be seriously affected. Not one of these arguments had any legal
basis. The FTC is free however, to reinterpret its Guidelines at any
time and frequently does so. Further, there is no time limit on its
review procedures. Theoretically, it can find violations of law at
any time during and even after the agreement term. Finally,
though the third argument was not a legal argument in any form,
the FTC conceded these points in private discussions with the li-
censee, and agreed to modify its request for amendment. Though
the FTC's action in this case may have reflected a weak legal basis
for the specific objections, the compromise clearly would not have
occurred if the Japanese party had not taken a strong defensive
stance.
The above example is hardly the typical case. Partly because
the change will be beneficial to it and partly because of Japanese
reluctance to oppose the FTC bureaucracy, the Japanese party is
more likely to contact the foreign party and request amendments
to the agreement in accordance with the FTC recommendation. If
40. Quotation from a translation of a letter from the Fair Trade Commission to the
Japanese party of an international agreement under review.
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the FTC has a sound legal basis for its objection, the Japanese
party cannot be faulted for seeking compliance. There have unfor-
tunately been cases in which the Japanese party has apparently
cooperated too closely with the FTC. In these instances the foreign
party has had reason to suspect that the provisions objected to
were in fact pointed out to the FTC by the Japanese party with
the intent of forcing amendment. These cases are rare, however,
and generally the foreign party should consider the Japanese
party's position sympathetically. The FTC is a government agency
with broad jurisdiction over Japanese business and extensive en-
forcement powers.
Even if the Japanese party is not prepared to do full-dress
battle, it is not necessary to capitulate completely to the FTC rec-
ommendations. The parties may enter into discussions with the
FTC reviewer to clarify the exact parameters of the objection and
to reach a compromise on the requested changes. There have been
instances when the FTC has misunderstood the language of the
agreement and discussions have obviated the requirement to
amend. Frequently discussion will result in less drastic modifica-
tions to the agreement than originally proposed in the FTC letter.
Very rarely, the FTC will back down from its position. If changes
are to be made in the agreement, the alternative or additional lan-
guage can be discussed and given prior clearance by the reviewer.
This has the desirable effect of precluding a reoccurrence of the
objection. The discussion process is a well established procedure in
FTC practice and should be considered by the parties as the
equivalent of their day in court. As is further discussed below, it is
the only opportunity for the foreign party to inject its views in an
attempt to alter the final result.
It is essential, then, that the foreign party have effective repre-
sentation during the FTC discussion. For reasons that may be all
too obvious, the process should not be left to the Japanese party's
representative. As the FTC reviewer will strongly prefer to speak
in the Japanese language at the meeting, Japanese counsel or the
services of a Japanese affiliate are usually necessary to convey the
foreign party's viewpoint.
The meetings and discussions with the FTC can be held over a
period of several months before the Agency will take any further
action. The FTC prefers to obtain results by persuasion rather
than by formal order and will therefore delay issuing an order until
the possibility of voluntary compliance is exhausted. The time
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gained can be used by the parties to reach compromises on a busi-
ness level including readjustment of the terms of the agreement to
reduce the need for the objectionable provisions. During the nego-
tiation period, the provisions in question will remain enforceable
between the parties.
If the discussions fail, the FTC will conduct a hearing and
eventually will issue an order to cease and desist or take any other
measure deemed necessary to eliminate the violation.' Cases in
which such orders were issued are rare, but that fact is undoubt-
edly due to the high rate of voluntary compliance and not to any
legal difficulties in obtaining the order. The order will be directed
against the Japanese party, which then has very little option but to
obtain amendment of the agreement or breach. If it does not com-
ply, it is subject to court order and its officers may be subject to
criminal proceedings initiated by the FTC. Most Japanese busi-
nessmen prefer to avoid involvement with court proceedings, par-
ticularly proceedings in which they are criminal defendants.
It is possible to challenge the FTC order in court. Under Arti-
cle 11 of the Act, decisions of the FTC are subject to court review.
Suit must be filed in the Tokyo High Court within thirty days of
the effective date of the FTC order.' The Court then requires
transfer of the FTC record and findings of fact for its review. 48
However, the Court's review of the record is limited by statutory
provision. Decisions will be invalidated only if not supported by
substantial facts or if inconsistent with the Constitution or other
laws." The scope of the review is intended to give the FTC a large
area of discretion within which to develop its policy objectives.
One important caveat must be put on the right of review. In
1971, a Danish company brought suit in the Tokyo High Court,
seeking review of an FTC order which directed deletion of provi-
sions from its license agreement with a Japanese licensee. The suit
was dismissed by the Court on the grounds that the Danish com-
pany had no standing to challenge the order. The Court ruled that
the Japanese company, as the party named in the FTC order, had
sole right to seek the Court review." Since the Japanese party will
41. Antimonopoly Act, supra note 1, at arts. 45 to 70-2.
42. Id. art. 77.
43. Id. art. 78.
44. Id. art. 82.
45. Novo Industri A/S v. K6sei Torihiki Iinkai, in Hanrei Taimuzu (No. 264) 215-17
(Tokyo High Court 1971) [this case is discussed in the Interim Report by the Committee on
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almost always be the respondent in the FTC action, the foreign
licensor or manufacturer is essentially precluded from the court
remedy. And it will not be easy in most cases to convince the Japa-
nese party to seek review. The Japanese party will consider that
the important battles must be waged during discussions with the
FTC reviewer. The foreign party is well advised to adopt the same
attitude.
V. ALTERNATIVE APPROACHES
If the above-described review procedure gives the prospective
licensor or exporter to Japan serious doubts, there are alternative
ways to approach the Article 6 requirement which afford the par-
ties additional flexibility. These are not appropriate in all cases,
but should be considered if an FTC objection seems probable.
If the provision which may be objectionable is absolutely criti-
cal to the parties' agreement, it is possible to avoid the Article 6
review entirely. The foreign party has only to establish a Japanese
branch office or subsidiary to enter into the agreement with the
Japanese party. If the two signatories are both Japanese legal enti-
ties, the agreement is not an "international agreement" within the
meaning of Article 6 and no filing is required."' The agreement
may then contain provisions which the FTC would not permit.
Such provisions are, however, entirely enforceable between the
parties.
This method of circumventing the FTC review is of course ex-
pensive. Japanese subsidiaries may not be formed off-the-shelf.
Japanese counsel must be retained, capital invested, and consider-
able personnel time expended in setting up the subsidiary. Estab-
lishing a branch office also requires legal services and adequate
financing. Some licensors with extensive business in Japan have
found it expedient to set up Japanese subsidiaries, but it is not a
solution in most Article 6 objection cases.
the Extra-territorial Application of Restrictive Trade Regulation, reprinted in 16 JAPANESE
ANN. INT'L L. 70, 70-72 (1972)]; afl'd, 29-10 Sai-han Minshu 1592 (Supreme Court 1975).
The Supreme Court affirmed on the same grounds but distinguished between cases in which
the FTC has issued its order based on acquiescence of the Japanese party to the FTC rec-
ommendation and cases where the order is issued after a full hearing. The Novo case in-
volved an order issued after the Japanese party accepted the FTC recommendation. The
Supreme Court decision thus left open the question of whether or not the foreign party
could seek review of an order issued after a hearing.
46. Kokusai-teki ky~tei mata wa kokusai-teki keiyaku no todokeide ni kansuru
kisoku, supra note 16.
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For companies obliged to undergo the Article 6 review, one of
the most problematic aspects is that the review takes place after
performance under the agreement has already commenced. Thus
the licensee is already in possession of the know-how, or the distri-
bution network has already been set up when the foreign party
learns that the agreement must be rewritten. If the licensor or
manufacturer is particularly concerned about the timing factor, it
is possible to obtain pre-review clearance of an agreement.
Technically under the FTC Notification concerning filing of
international agreements, the agreement must be executed by the
parties prior to submission. However, on request the FTC review-
ers will meet with the parties and will examine provisions which
the parties believe might be objected to during the formal review.
For obvious reasons, the parties should request FTC examination
of all provisions even remotely susceptible to FTC objection.
Within a relatively short time after the meeting, the FTC will in-
form the parties whether or not it considers any of the specified
terms objectionable. If the FTC response is negative, the parties
may proceed with execution and performance without concern that
amendments will be required at a later date. If the FTC indicates
that it considers any of the specified terms objectionable, the par-
ties can adjust their agreement or even call off the arrangement
without damaging their business positions.
As in the first alternative discussed above, the pre-review
clearance involves cost and expenditure of time by the parties. The
foreign party will usually be required to have Japanese counsel or
other representative in Tokyo to attend the meetings with the
FTC. Because of the procedural burden, this alternative is useful
to high technology licensors unwilling to risk disclosure of know-
how without assurance of exact agreement terms. It may not be
warranted in the case of an ordinary license or distributorship
agreement.
The final alternative approach carries considerable risk, and
opinions of Japanese counsel differ on its effectiveness. If the pos-
sible FTC objection involves the terms of a grant-back provision,
some Japanese counsel believe that the grant-back may be effec-
tively separated from the main license agreement and embodied in
a separate agreement. The new agreement would in effect be a li-
cense agreement in which the Japanese party is the licensor. Under
a Cabinet Order issued by the Japanese government, Japanese
companies are specifically permitted to enter into an international
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license for their technology, subject only to government review of
the adequacy of the consideration. 7 It is generally believed that
business opportunity or other intangible consideration will be ade-
quate for such a review. In this way the FTC "substantial equal-
ity" rule is avoided, giving the parties more room in which to
structure a satisfactory business arrangement.
Japanese counsel advise that it is possible that the FTC will
eventually merge the two license agreements, (the new license
agreement is also an international agreement and therefore must
be filed within thirty days of its execution with the FTC), apply its
substantial equality standards, and object to the terms of the li-
cense granted by the Japanese party. However, if the FTC does
overcome procedural questions and looks through the structure
utilizing the two agreements, the parties are no worse off for the
attempt and may proceed to amend the terms of the agreements as
required.
None of the above alternatives is a complete solution for pos-
sible problems arising under the Article 6 review requirement. In
most cases the parties will simply have to adjust their agreement
in order to come within the FTC Guidelines as interpreted and
applied at the time of review. Since that may not be a simple mat-
ter, United States counsel should, after consultation with Japanese
counsel, advise his or her client of these ramifications prior to
finalizing a contract, so as to mitigate and make the client aware of
the possibility of objection and subsequent amendment to the
agreement. Awareness of possible FTC questions on the grant-
back, non-competition, and quality control terms will encourage a
flexible approach to these areas on the business level.
VI. CONCLUSION
Entering the Japanese market is a challenge to the foreign
businessman and the attorney alike. For the businessman, there
are such obstacles as a complex distribution system, consumer re-
sistance, and translation questions. For the attorney there are the
usual hurdles of tax, patent and trademark law, and foreign invest-
ment regulation. In addition, however, United States counsel will
find ample challenge in structuring the agreement within the stric-
tures of the Japanese Antimonopoly Law.
47. Gaikoku kawase kanrirei, supra note 17.
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